Are the Balkans Different? Mapping Protest Politics in Post-Communist Southeast Europe by Tatar, Marius Ioan
www.ssoar.info
Are the Balkans Different? Mapping Protest Politics
in Post-Communist Southeast Europe
Tatar, Marius Ioan
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Konferenzbeitrag / conference paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Tatar, M. I. (2013). Are the Balkans Different? Mapping Protest Politics in Post-Communist Southeast Europe. In F.
Bieber, & D. Brentin (Eds.), Social Movements in the Balkans: Rebellion and Protest from Maribor to Taksim (pp.
1-31)Universität Graz, Zentrum für Südosteuropastudien. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-59039-8
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/1.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/1.0
 1 
 
Are the Balkans Different? Mapping Protest Politics in Post-
Communist Southeast Europe 
 
 
 
Marius I. TATAR 
University of Oradea 
 
 
 
Abstract:  This chapter examines the dynamics and determinants of different forms of 
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Transitions to democracy and EU integration processes in post-communist Europe 
were accompanied by relatively low levels of protest mobilization. However, in recent years 
new waves of protests have emerged in the region, ranging from mass demonstrations to 
organized strikes and riots. The spread of elite-challenging activities suggests a revival of 
protest politics in former communist countries during the current economic crisis. This 
chapter comparatively examines the dynamics and determinants of different forms of protest 
activities in Southeast Europe1 (SEE). Drawing on theoretical insights derived from the 
political behavior and social movements literatures this chapter analyzes the profile of 
different types of protesters and also the factors that can account for their preference for 
certain forms of protest actions versus others. Research on SEE often investigates citizen 
participation from a cross-national perspective at one point in time, especially emphasizing 
aspects of electoral participation. This study follows a longitudinal approach that captures the 
dynamic phenomena of protest participation using statistical analysis of survey datasets (such 
as. the successive waves of European Values Surveys and World Values Surveys) which 
allow cross-national and within country comparisons over time. Besides assessing the effects 
of individual-level variables, the paper also considers country-level contextual factors such as 
the levels of democratic and economic development.  
The countries I am focusing on in this chapter are new democracies. During their 
transition from communism, some of these societies experienced relatively long periods of 
political instability, economic distress2, interethnic and inter-confessional tensions and even 
armed conflicts. Thus, the question that arises is whether protest politics strengthens or 
                                                          
1 The states included in this analysis offer a significant cross-country variation in terms of protest patterns: 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and 
Slovenia. 
2 A notable example in this sense is the Albanian economic crisis of 1997 that was accompanied by 
unprecedented institutional, political and social turmoil leading to a spiral of violence and chaos (Vaughan-
Whitehead 1999). 
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weakens the prospects of democratic consolidation in this region? In other words, who is 
more prone to protest: those having authoritarian orientations or those who share a 
democratic political culture? If for instance, citizens oriented toward authoritarianism are 
more likely to be politically engaged in this region, then the processes of democratic 
consolidation might be threatened. A massive involvement of authoritarian minded citizens in 
the political process might provide a good ground for the emergence of populist 
authoritarianism in these countries (Krajnc, Flere, and Kirbiš 2012). If on the other hand, 
citizens who participate in protests are on average more democratically oriented, sometimes 
called critical democrats (Dalton and Welzel 2014), then they can challenge political elites, 
demanding more open, accountable and responsive democratic governance. In this case, 
protesters may have the potential to play a pivotal role in the democratic consolidation 
process in post-communist countries (Guérin, Petry, and Crête 2004).  
 The rest of this paper is structured into five main parts. First, I will conceptualize 
protest politics within the framework of democratic theories and then I will briefly review 
arguments derived from some of most influential theoretical perspectives aiming to explain 
protest participation. In the next section, I draw a general picture of the dynamics of protest 
politics in post-communist SEE before the economic crisis. Then I focus on the features of 
participants in two of the most common forms of protesting, that are signing petitions and 
demonstrating. Further on, the chapter explores the patterns of protest politics during the 
economic crisis by a comparative analysis of Romania and Slovenia. I conclude with a 
discussion of the main findings and their implications for our understanding on how protest 
action repertoires are reconfigured in post-communist societies and their consequences for 
democratic governance and stability in the region. 
 
Conceptualizing and Explaining Protest Participation: Theoretical Perspectives 
 
Protest politics is understood as the deliberate use of protest actions by groups or 
organizations (and sometimes by individual citizens) in order to influence a political 
decision or process, which they perceive as having negative consequences for themselves, 
another group or society as a whole (Dalton 2013, 52-56). Political protest can refer to 
any political and social issue that is debated and contested, ranging from single issue 
protests to broad reformist or revolutionary plans to shape the society. Some groups use 
protest as a key mechanism to make their voice heard, while others use it to a much lesser 
extent or not at all (Rucht 2007, 708). In addition to the kinds of actors and aims, the 
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levels and forms of political protest vary extremely. Protest can take different forms, 
ranging from legal ones (legal strikes and demonstrations, petitions, complaints, etc.) to 
illegal and sometimes violet ones (illegal strikes, violent demonstrations, occupying 
buildings, blocking roads, etc.). The distinctions mentioned above are important both for 
studying the degree of protest participation but also for understanding the motivational 
dynamics underlying various forms of protests (Opp and Kittel 2010). In terms of 
participation degree, a significant part of the population might approve and even 
participate in actions that comply with the norms of the existing social system such as 
petitioning or taking part in a peaceful demonstration. On the other hand, usually only an 
extreme minority engages in actions that violate social rules such as violent protests, 
occupying buildings or public spaces and blocking roads (Tătar 2015, Guérin, Petry, and 
Crête 2004). Moreover, different motivational attitudes might explain participation in 
different forms of protest (Uslaner 2004).  
 The question as to why do people engage in political protests has generated a lot of 
interest among scholars coming from various disciplines such as political science, 
sociology, political economy, social psychology and history. Reponses to this question 
are divided between macro and micro level approaches, which belong to different 
scholarly traditions (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2006). Macro accounts derived mainly 
from historical sociology and comparative politics seek to explain the cycles of protest 
mobilization and processes of contentious politics as systemic phenomena. Among macro 
approaches, prominent are political process theories contending that in order to protest, 
aggrieved people not only need strategic resources, but also certain suitable political 
contexts (Tarrow 1998, McAdam 1982, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996) that 
guarantee more open political opportunity structures (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Compared 
to authoritarian regimes, democracies further collective action by relaxing repression, 
encouraging associational life, and opening channels of popular participation (Johnston 
and Almeida 2006). In this sense, democracies tend to lower the cost of protest 
participation, while in the same time increase its potential benefits. Alternatively, micro 
approaches focus on individual level behavior linking specific characteristics of social 
background, social networks and attitudinal orientations to one’s propensity to engage in 
protest actions (Dalton 2013, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013b, Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). 
Initially, radical disaffection theories viewed protest politics as an irrational outburst 
of potentially discontented classes such as the poor, the youth and uneducated and 
 5 
 
unemployed that threaten the public order (Rucht 2007, Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2006). 
However, subsequent studies have found little empirical evidence that the most politically 
alienated and deprived people are those who protest more (Dalton 2013). On the contrary, 
relative deprivation theories convincingly explained why the objectively most deprived 
people were not necessarily the ones that made their voice heard through protests (Rucht 
2007). While the conclusion of relative deprivation theories is that at the heart of every 
protest are grievances (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013b), not all aggrieved people 
protest. Only when additional factors come into play do grievances result into actual protest 
(Rucht 2007). Supporters of modernization theory (Inglehart 1997, 1990, 1977) suggest that 
protest politics will be used more often by middle class and university educated people 
holding post-materialist values (Dalton 2013), since these segments of the population have 
the resourced and cognitive skills required by this kind of elite-challenging activism. At 
country aggregate levels, previous research has pointed out that citizens tend to engage more 
both in conventional and protest forms of political activity in socioeconomically more 
developed countries (Blais 2007, Bernhagen and Marsh 2007, Norris 2002, Newton and 
Montero 2007). 
 Individual level explanations of political participation often focus on resources that 
facilitate political action and lay the groundwork for the civic voluntarism model (Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995). This model includes status variables such as: age, 
socioeconomic status, education, class and residence (Pattie and Johnston 1998). Education is 
one of the strongest predictors of participation because it provides cognitive and civic 
awareness which helps citizens better understand politics (Norris 2002). The main thesis of 
the socio-economic model is that people with higher economic status - higher education, 
higher incomes, and better occupational positions - are more active in politics. In addition to 
skills and other resources that can facilitate civic involvement, motivation is also necessary 
for individuals to become active in politics. Among the most prominent motivational attitudes 
and values mentioned in the literature as influencing activism are: political interest and 
support for the political system, confidence in the main political institutions of representative 
democracy such as the parliament, the government, or political parties (Quintelier and van 
Deth 2014, Schussman and Soule 2005). Beside instrumental motivations to protest, some 
people may protest based on ideological (leftist or rightist) or expressive considerations 
(Klandermans 2004). Persons expressing several values associated with a democratic culture 
such as lifestyle tolerance, tolerance towards immigrants and gender role egalitarianism 
(Kirbiš 2013, Guérin, Petry, and Crête 2004), or those having more inclusive views on 
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nationality and a cosmopolitan sense of belonging (Tarrow 2012) are expected to be more 
engaged in protest activities. Political socialization (Petrovic, Stekelenburg, and Klandermans 
2014) and willingness to affect changes in society (Martin 2015) are also factors associated 
with more activism protest movements.  
 Most protest events are not spontaneous and solitary acts but organized collective 
actions (Fillieule 1997). Therefore, both the propensity to protest and the repertoire of protest 
actions is highly contingent on a person’s belonging to various social networks and 
organizations that actually create the availability of collective action opportunities (van 
Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013b). Moreover, the effect of embeddedness into social 
networks on the propensity to participate in politics depends on the amount of political 
discussion that occurs in social networks and the information that people are able to gather 
about politics as a result (McClurg 2003). Organizational approaches emphasize the 
mobilizing role of agents and social networks, including political parties, unions, religious 
organizations (churches) and voluntary associations in activating political engagement. 
Following Robert Putnam (2000, 1993) a plethora of studies emphasize the role of voluntary 
associations in fostering social and political participation (Alexander et al. 2012, Kriesi 2008, 
Deth 2006, Newton 2001, Levi 1996). According to Putnam's social capital theory, a wide 
range of heterogeneous organizations and social groups enable face to face meetings of 
members and contribute to the production of dense civic networks that strengthen community 
bonds and social trust. The literature on social capital and civil society highlights that 
proximity to an organization (political or not) has the effect of channeling individuals more or 
less directly into politics (Zakaria 2013, Wallace, Pichler, and Haerpfer 2012, Uhlin 2009, 
Lambright, Mischen, and Laramee 2009, Diani 2009). In most direct ways, a person who 
belongs to more groups has higher odds to be politically involved as s/he has higher chances 
to be recruited and invited to participate politically. Moreover, socially involved people are 
more likely to recognize the relevance of politics to their lives and eventually get involved in 
politics, simply because they contact, meet and converse with more people than socially 
isolated persons who are most often marginalized and politically alienated (Woshinsky 2008). 
 
Trends of protest politics in South-Eastern Europe: a comparative perspective 
 
I use European Values Survey (EVS) and World Values Survey (WVS) datasets to 
measure citizens’ involvement in elite-challenging activities. Respondents to these public 
opinion polls were asked whether they have actually done the following activities: signing a 
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petition, attending lawful demonstrations, joining in boycotts, joining unofficial strikes, and 
occupying buildings or factories (see Table 1). However, these five protest activities differ in 
the risk involved and the violence inherent to each act— and also in the extent to which an 
individual is prepared use these actions. In this sense, relatively innocuous behaviors, such as 
signing a petition or attending a peaceful demonstration are practiced by more people 
compared to increasingly severe forms of protest, such as occupations and riots. And this 
general pattern of what we might call the civility of protest politics holds in each of the five 
European regions, although Western European citizens are more active on all five items, 
including the more contentious ones. 
 
Table 1: Protest participation in Europe 2008. Regional variation in a comparative 
perspective  
  
Signing 
a 
petitio
n 
Attending 
lawful 
demonstrati
ons 
Joining 
in 
boycotts 
Joining 
unofficial 
strikes 
Occupyin
g 
buildings 
or 
factories 
Summari
zed 
protest 
activity 
(at least 
1) 
Post-communist 
SEE 
23.7% 12.1% 8.6% 4.1% 1.8% 29.1% 
Western Europe 52.0% 25.1% 12.5% 5.8% 2.9% 58.0% 
Post-communist 
CEE 
21.3% 7.8% 2.9% 1.5% 0.5% 25.2% 
Former Soviet 
countries 
10.2% 12.3% 5.6% 5.3% 1.9% 23.3% 
Other  12.8% 11.3% 4.5% 1.6% 1.1% 18.3% 
Data source: EVS 2008.  
To aggregate protest participation into a variable more readily comparable across 
countries I constructed a summary measure of protest activism. The last column in Table 1 
reports the percentages of respondents who said they have engaged in at least one of the five 
protest actions. I use this summary measure in Figure 1 to present the dynamics of protest 
politics in each of the ten South-Eastern European countries analyzed in this paper. There are 
divergent trends of protest politics in the two decades that preceded the economic crisis. In 
some countries such as Romania the numbers of protesters has dramatically decreased on all 
five forms of protest presented in Table 1 an also on the aggregate measure of protest 
participation. By contrast, in Macedonia there is a substantial increase of the share of 
protesters on all five items while in Slovenia significant increases are recorded particularly in 
terms of signing petitions and attending demonstrations (see Table 2). On the other hand, the 
aggregate share of protesters remained virtually the same in Croatia at almost 45% of the 
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adult population. However, it should be noted that petitioners, representing around 41% of 
the population both in 1996 and 2008, make up the bulk of protesters in Croatia (see Table 2). 
Nevertheless, the share of Croatians joining in boycotts increased from 4.3% to 9.1% and the 
proportion of those attending demonstrations grew from 6.5% to 8.4% from 1996 to 2008 but 
these figures do not weight considerably in the aggregate share of protesters as shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Trends of protest participation in post-communist SEE, 1995-2008 
 
Data source: WVS 1995, EVS 2008 
 
Beside divergent trends, Figure 1 also points out a high between-country variation in 
the share of protesters: from less than 15% in Romania and Bulgaria to almost 45% in Croatia 
and Kosovo and almost 40% in Macedonia and Slovenia. What factors can account for these 
significant differences? Two of the usual suspects are: first, the level of democratic 
development suggested by the political opportunity structure theory and second, the level of 
economic development suggested by modernization theory. Figure 2 points out that, contrary 
to expectations derived from political opportunity structure theory, there seems to be no 
significant relationship between the level of democracy and the levels of protest activity in 
these countries. In other words, countries that are more democratically developed and 
presumably provide the more opportunities for protest (increasing the benefits and lowering 
the costs of protests) are not necessarily the ones in which citizens protest more. For instance, 
at the onset of the economic crisis, EU member countries like Slovenia, Romania and 
Bulgaria, which scored higher on democratic development as measured by the World Bank’s 
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worldwide governance indicators3 in 2008, had lower shares of protesters compared with 
Kosovo and Macedonia. These findings suggest that protest politics in the Balkans might be 
explained by other factors not accounted for by theories mainly developed based on empirical 
data collected in advanced democracies.  
 
Figure 2: Quality of democracy and protest activity in SEE Europe (2008) 
 
Data Source: EVS 2008; World Bank, WGI 2008, accessed 14.02.2014 
 
 
 
However, when we include economic development into equation we note two 
divergent trends (see Figure 3).  First, economic and democratic developments strongly 
correlate. Thus, higher levels of GDP/capita are associated with higher quality of democracy 
and this confirms expectations derived from modernization theories. Slovenia as well as 
Croatia particularly stand out from this point of view. Second, protest activity is very poorly 
related to economic development in post-communist Southeast Europe, contrary to what 
modernization theory would suggest. For instance, less developed states like Macedonia and 
Kosovo have much higher protest rates than more developed countries in the region. Previous 
studies have linked increased citizen participation in economically less developed post-
                                                          
3 The World Bank provides aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215 countries and territories 
over the period 1996–2012, for six dimensions of governance. Available online at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators, accessed 14.02.2014. 
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Yugoslav states to a growing politicization of these societies along deep-rooted cleavages 
(such as those based on ethnic and religious fragmentation) that have structured political 
conflict and competition (see Kirbiš 2013 for a synteshis on post-Yugoslav citizen 
participation). Nevertheless, our data suggest more complex patterns of relationships between 
various factors and protest participation in this region. For instance, a country marked by 
relatively low levels of ethnic and religious diversity such as Croatia also records higher 
levels of protest participation than its economic development would predict (see figure 3). As 
shown above, petitioners represent the biggest part of Croatian protesters (see Table 2) while 
in Kosovo and Macedonia beside petitioners, there are relatively high numbers of 
demonstrators and persons who join in boycotts. 
 
Figure 3: Economic development, quality of democracy and protest activity in SEE 
(2008) 
 
Data source: EVS 2008, World Bank WGI, 2008, accessed 14.02.2014. 
 
 
Overall, country aggregated levels of economic development and quality of 
democracy do not offer satisfactory explanations for the variation of the share of protesters in 
this region. It seems that other factors come into play when explaining protest participation at 
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the country-aggregate level (Krajnc, Flere, and Kirbiš 2012). In the next sections, I will move 
from country aggregate to the individual level analysis that will highlight the features of 
protesters in each of the ten countries of post-communist SEE. This will be done by 
comparing the determinants of petitioning and demonstrating, two of the most commonly 
used forms of protest action. 
 
Who Protests in SEE? Comparing Determinants of Petitioning and Demonstrating 
across Countries and Regions 
 
This section outlines the profile of protesters in post-communist South-Eastern 
Europe by comparing the individual determinants of signing petitions and participation in 
lawful demonstrations. While an increasing number studies investigate how internet is 
influencing political activism (Gibson and Cantijoch 2013, Cantijoch, Cutts, and Gibson 
2015) particularly among the youth (Xenos, Vromen, and Loader 2014), many point out a 
digital divide that reinforces traditional socioeconomic inequalities in online participation 
(Oser, Hooghe, and Marien 2013). For instance, the spread of internet may have reduced the 
cost of signing petitions, but this does not necessarily increase the share of petitioners in all 
countries. In fact, as data in Table 2 show from 1998 to 2008, the proportion of those who 
signed a petition has decreased in 3 countries and increased in other 6 countries. This 
suggests that beside a simple cost-benefit rationale, there are also other relevant factors that 
influence signing petitions (see Table 3 in Appendix). The most spectacular increases in 
terms of shares of petitioners occurred in Macedonia from about 14% to more than 36% and 
in Slovenia from 17% to 33%. In the same period, the proportion of those who attended a 
lawful demonstration dropped in 5 countries and increased in 4. The most dramatic decrease 
in the share of demonstrators occurred in Romania, from 18% to 6.8, while the most 
significant increase is registered in Macedonia, from 9.9% to 18.2%. 
 
Table 2: Dynamics of petitioning and demonstrating in SEE, 1998-2008 
  
  
Signing a petition Attending lawful demonstrations 
1998 2008 Difference 
2008-1998 
1998 2008 Difference 
2008-1998 
Bulgaria 5.7% 8.8% 3.1 9.0% 7.6% -1.4 
Romania 14.3% 10.3% -4.0 18.1% 6.8% -11.3 
Montenegro 13.8% 17.5% 3.7 10.8% 9.2% -1.6 
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Signing a petition Attending lawful demonstrations 
1998 2008 Difference 
2008-1998 
1998 2008 Difference 
2008-1998 
Albania 23.0% 18.6% -4.4 16.1% 10.1% -6.1 
Serbia 18.3% 21.1% 2.8 7.0% 12.9% 5.9% 
Bosnia Herzegovina 22.6% 22.0% -0.6 7.8% 6.2% -1.5 
Kosovo* - 29.5% - - 28.1% - 
Slovenia 17.6% 33.0% 15.4 8.7% 12.7% 3.9 
Macedonia 14.3% 34.6% 20.3 9.9% 18.2% 8.2 
Croatia 41.1% 41.9% 0.8 6.5% 8.4% 1.9 
Note: Data represent the % of the respondents reporting to have signed a petition, respectively to have 
attended a lawful demonstration. Cells marked with grey represent a decrease in signing petitions and 
attending demonstrations in a specific country. *Data is not available separately for Kosovo in the 1995/1998 
wave of World Values Survey. 
 
The propensity to participate in these two forms of protest is compared based on 25 
socio-demographic and attitudinal factors which have been introduced as predictor variables 
in logistic regression statistical models (See Appendix I, Tables 3 and 4). Overall, in 
Southeast Europe men tend to participate more than women both in petition signing and 
demonstrations. For instance, in Macedonia and Romania men are 1.75, respectively 1.56 
times more likely to sign petitions, compared to women, all other things being equal. 
Moreover, gender is a particularly influent predictor of attending demonstrations in countries 
like Macedonia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Kosovo. However, in some 
countries the effect of gender on protest participation seems to be mediated by attitudinal 
factors (among which interest in politics is probably the most prominent) which can account 
for differences between men and women. Overall, the gender gap seems to be smaller in 
terms of petition signing compared to demonstrating, suggesting women’s propensity to 
engage in less confrontational forms of protest actions. 
Age is the second socio-demographic variable used in statistical models to predict 
protest. When we control for other variables such as education, employment status and 
political values and attitudes, age seems to have no clearly discernible effect on participation 
to lawful demonstration. But some variation does occur when we analyze the relationship 
between age and petitioning. In general, young and adult persons seem to be more prone to 
sign petitions in SEE, although this pattern does not hold in every country. For instance, in 
Montenegro persons between 18-29 years old are 1.54 times more likely to have signed a 
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petition compared with persons over 50 years old. On the other hand, in Macedonia younger 
persons are (0.64 times) less likely to have signed petitions than their older counterparts, 
while in Croatia and Slovenia middle-age individuals seem to have a higher propensity to 
sign petitions. Further longitudinal studies might better elucidate if these differences are due 
to simple life-cycle effects or do they originate in more profound generational differences 
coming from divergent patterns of political socialization in different socio-political and 
economic contexts.  
Overall, both petitioners and demonstrators tend to have higher levels of education, 
compared to non-protestors. The effect of individuals’ level of education on their propensity 
to sign petitions is however more evident in countries like Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Kosovo, while education has significant influences on the likelihood to demonstrate only in 
Bulgaria, controlling for the effect of all the other variables included in this statistical model. 
However, bivariate analyses reveal that in each of the ten SEE countries, more educated 
people are more likely to sign petitions and demonstrate than persons with lower levels of 
education (details not shown here). Despite this fact, the effect of education on protesting 
seems to lose its statistical significance in the multivariate models presented in tables 3 and 4 
(see Appendix I), most probably because the impact of education on citizen participation is 
mediated by other intervening variables. 
People with higher family incomes, relative to their fellow citizens, tend to engage 
more in signing petitions and this pattern holds in six out of ten SEE countries. However, 
household revenues seem to have a much lower and sometimes contradictory influence on 
demonstrating. For instance, in only two countries (Albania and Slovenia) has income a 
statistically significant effect on participation in peaceful demonstrations. However, in these 
two cases the patterns are divergent: while in Albania persons with higher family incomes 
tend to demonstrate more, in Slovenia they are less prone to get involved in street protests. 
Regardless of income, in general people living in bigger cities tend to sign petitions and 
demonstrate more than persons living in smaller localities. Students compared to their 
compatriots tend to have higher propensity to sign petitions particularly in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia, and to demonstrate in countries like Bulgaria, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Slovenia and Serbia. Being an employed person is also associated with a higher 
probability to sign petitions and demonstrate suggesting that having a job plays an important 
social integration role that can provide an individual with the resources and incentives needed 
to participate.   
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Members of various organizations tend to engage more often in protest actions. 
However, membership and participation in different organizations such as trade unions, 
political parties, civil society organizations and church attendance seems to have uneven 
influence on people’s repertoires of protest actions. Overall, data in tables 3 and 4 indicate 
that in SEE trade unionists are more prone to participate in demonstrations. On the other 
hand, members of civil society organizations tend to engage in more legalist ways of protest 
such as petition signing, while political party members are more inclined to participate both 
in petitioning and demonstrations, compared to the general public. Yet these patterns 
significantly vary across countries. For instance, trade union membership is a particularly 
strong predictor of attending lawful demonstrations in Bulgaria, Croatia and Montenegro, 
while being insignificant in Albania and Kosovo. Similarly, civil society membership has an 
important effect on the propensity to sign petitions in Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, 
Romania, Kosovo, Slovenia and Macedonia, and it does not reach statistical significance in 
the rest of the SEE countries. Party joiners are more prone to sign petitions in Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, and to demonstrate in Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Romania, Serbia and Macedonia, while on the other hand in Kosovo they tend to 
engage less in street protests compared to their compatriots. In fact, in Kosovo civil society 
membership and the frequency of church attendance (of those belonging to a Muslim 
religious denomination) seem to be more important mobilizing factors for engagement in 
demonstrations, than party and union membership. On the pooled sample, fervent 
churchgoers in SEE have a slightly higher probability to participate in demonstrations, 
although frequency of church attendance reaches statistical significance as a predictor of 
demonstrating only in Bulgaria and Kosovo. Overall, people who discuss politics with their 
friends are more likely to sign petitions and to demonstrate, while trust in fellow citizens has 
a minimal effect on petition signing and no significant effect on demonstrating.           
Values and attitudes also represent important predictors of protest participation. On 
average, people who display post-materialist values (i.e. prioritize giving people more say in 
governance and protecting freedom of speech over maintaining order and fighting rising 
prices), those who have an inclusive view on nationality (i.e. believe that place of birth, 
ancestry, knowledge of official language or long time residency in a country are not really 
important for being ‘truly a national’ of a country) and have a cosmopolitan sense of 
belonging (those who say they first belong to the world as a whole or to Europe and not to 
their country/region/locality) are more likely to sign petitions and demonstrate in SEE. On the 
other hand, those who have less positive views on immigrants, tend to protest more. Lifestyle 
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tolerance (measured here as the belief that homosexuality, abortion and divorce can be 
justified) and more egalitarian views on gender roles (operationalized here as the belief that 
men do not have more right to jobs than women) are also positively associated with a higher 
propensity to sign petitions, but not to attend demonstrations. Moreover, petitioners (and in 
some countries demonstrators too) tend to favor social change to a higher degree than their 
compatriots. For instance, those who believe that their society should be changed (more 
radically through revolution or more moderately through reforms) are on average more likely 
to have signed petitions compared to those who consider that their society should be 
“valiantly defended against all change” (EVS 2011).  
What is however less clear from this analysis is the direction of social changes (i.e. 
ideological orientations) towards which petitioners consider that their society should move. In 
SEE, those who place themselves at the extremes of the Left-Right ideological axis tend to 
sign petitions and to demonstrate more, compared to those who place themselves at the center 
of this axis. In addition, those who have a clear ideological identification with the Left or 
with the Right tend to have higher levels of support for democracy as a legitimate political 
regime, but they are not necessarily more trustful in particular political institutions and 
organizations (parliament, government, parties). Ideological self-placement at the extremes of 
the Left-Right axis is particularly salient for attending demonstrations in Romania, 
Montenegro and Macedonia, and for petition signing in Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina and 
Montenegro. However, further studies should elucidate and compare citizens’ interpretations 
of Left-Right ideological identifications in Western and Eastern Europe. It is very plausible 
that in the post-communist context people might interpret differently ideological self-
identifications, compared to their Western counterparts4.  
 Petition signing and participation to demonstrations are on average higher among 
persons who were more exposed to political socialization within family. Thus, both forms of 
protest are more frequent among persons who during their adolescence used to discuss 
politics with their parents and grew up in families where parents followed the news 
frequently. In general, those who have higher levels of support for democracy as a legitimate 
form of governance and who are interested in politics are more likely to have signed petitions 
and joined demonstrations in all the countries and regions analyzed here. 
 Although citizens of post-communist SEE do protest less than their Western 
counterparts, most of the predictors of elite-challenging actions analyzed here perform 
                                                          
4 For instance, in post-communist countries a right wing ideological identification might simply mean having a 
more liberal, anti-communist orientation. 
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similarly in East and West. Yet there are several notable differences between protesters living 
in these regions. For instance, in SEE countries men are more likely to sign petitions while in 
Western Europe women are more prone to petitioning. Younger persons (15-29 years old) are 
less likely to sign petitions in Western Europe while in SEE they have a higher probability to 
sign petitions compared to older persons (above 50 years old). In SEE, the bigger the size of 
locality in which one lives, the higher the changes of that person to have signed a petition, 
while in WE this predictor is statistically insignificant. Overall, students from Western 
countries are more prone to demonstrate compared to the rest of the population of their 
countries. Overall, in SEE this is not necessarily the case, although in some countries from 
this region students are substantially more prone to protest than the general public. In 
addition, in SEE fervent church goers tend to protest more compared to those who attend 
religious services less often or not at all. The situation is reversed in WE where, on average, 
attending religious services seems to decrease one’s likelihood to protest. In terms of 
ideological positioning, overall both in SEE and WE right wingers tend to be more frequent 
church goers than leftists. Tolerant attitudes towards immigration have also potentially 
divergent effects on one’s propensity to demonstrate. In Western Europe demonstrators tend 
have a somewhat more positive attitude towards immigrants, compared with their fellow 
citizens, while in South Eastern Europe the situation seems to be reversed. Overall, Western 
demonstrators tend have a stronger belief that their societies should be changed, compared to 
demonstrators in SEE.   
In terms of the relationship between ideological self-placement on the Left-Right axis 
and protest participation, one can note divergent patterns between South-Eastern and Western 
citizens. In SEE both those who identify themselves with the Left and with the Right tend to 
sign petitions and demonstrate more than those who place themselves at the center of the 
Left-Right axis. On the other hand, in Western Europe “leftists” tend to demonstrate more 
than “centrists”, while on their turn “rightists” tend to demonstrate less than “centrists”. In 
general, western Europeans who distrust political institutions are more prone to protest 
compared to their fellow citizens who have higher levels of institutional trust. Overall, in 
South Eastern Europe there seems to be no significant relationship between trust in political 
institutions and the propensity to protest.       
 
Developments during the Economic Crisis: a Closer Look on Romania and Slovenia 
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 Romania and Slovenia have been selected for a closer comparative analysis of protest 
dynamics during the recent economic crisis. The two countries are significantly different on 
several control variables including institutional set-up, trajectories and speed of transition to 
democracy, and levels of economic development, while being similar in terms of the severity 
with which the recent economic contraction hit their economies and also in terms of social 
and political responses to the crisis. These features qualify Slovenia and Romania for a “most 
different cases” comparative analysis that aims to explore patterns of protest participation 
during the economic crisis.  
Post-socialist transformations in Slovenia have been frequently qualified as a success 
story due to steady pace of democratization and increased economic prosperity compared 
with other former communist countries (Feldmann 2006, Bukowski 1999). By contrast, post-
communist Romania was most often considered a regional “laggard” (along with Bulgaria) in 
terms of building and consolidating liberal democracy, developing a prosperous nation, as 
well in the process of joining the EU (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008). Despite different levels 
of economic development at the outset of the crisis, Romania and Slovenia went after 2008 
through an equally dramatic economic contraction. According to Eurostat data5, the GDP of 
Slovenia declined in 2009 by 7.8% compared with 2008, while the GDP of Romania 
decreased with 7.1%. Unemployment data follows somewhat similar trends in both countries. 
In Romania unemployment rates increased from 5.8 in 2008 to 6.9 in 2009 and then to 7.3 in 
2010 while in Slovenia unemployment rates grew from 4.4 in 2008 to 6.9 in 2009 and 7.3 in 
2010.  Not only the severity of the crisis is comparable in Slovenia and Romania, but also the 
episodes of political instability and relatively long periods of social unrest that followed the 
economic contraction. Although the two countries had divergent trends of protest 
mobilization during their post-socialist transition, protest mobilization patterns seem to 
converge during the economic crisis. These developments may provide evidence that 
countries which have been equality hard hit by the crisis tend to experience similar political 
and social developments, regardless of previous differences between them. This could be so 
because as Bellinger and Arce (2011) have pointed out, literatures of contentious politics 
suggest that societal forces react to changes in economic conditions (i.e. decline) and 
economic policy (i.e. austerity) rather than overall levels of economic development or 
economic liberalization policy in general.        
                                                          
5 Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115, 
accessed 15.02.2015. 
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Indeed, Romania recorded in 2012 a revival of citizen activism after a relatively long 
period of political apathy (Tătar, 2105). Massive demonstrations erupted in January 2012 in 
most major cities in Romania. Protests have eventually led in February 2012 to the 
resignation of the center-right government that has adopted the austerity measures in 2010. 
Other protests started in the spring of 2012 against shale gas drilling projects, while the 
summer of 2012 has witnessed further street demonstrations. Similarly, a new wave of 
protests swept through Slovenia in late 2012 and 2013 after the center-right coalition 
government adopted a package of austerity measures in May 2012, including cuts in public 
sector wages and benefits. While both in Romania and Slovenia the first social reactions to 
austerity measures were economic protests organized by trade unions, after a period of 
accumulated grievances new social movements animated mass demonstrations against wider 
political issues, including political corruption and lack of governmental efficiency and 
responsiveness.         
 In order to compare the profile of petitioners and demonstrators before and during de 
economic crisis and show the robustness of results, the logistic regression statistical models 
contained similar predictor variables6 coming from EVS 2008 and WVS 2010-14 datasets. 
The results are presented in Appendix 1, Tables 3 and 4, which contain the Exp(B) logistic 
regression coefficients (odds ratio) for the determinants of signing petitions and attending 
demonstrations in Romania in 2008 and 2012 and Slovenia in 2008 and 2011.  
The strongest predictor for reporting petition signing and attending demonstrations in 
Romania in 2012 was interest in politics, while in 2008 this variable was a significant 
predictor only for demonstrating and not for petitioning. This indicates a potential increase in 
the explanatory power of this factor, meaning that during the economic crisis, Romanians 
more interested in politics were increasingly more likely to protest than those who were not 
interested in politics, controlling for all other factors in the model. In Slovenia in 2011, 
interest in politics was also the strongest predictor for attending demonstrations and the 
second strongest (after education) for petition signing, while in 2008 it was a significant 
determinant only for petitioning.        
Civil society membership is another factor which seems to have gained more leverage 
particularly in explaining participation to demonstrations during the economic crisis. In 2011-
2012, in Romania CSO members were 1.7 more likely, while in Slovenia they were over 2 
                                                          
6 Four items included in EVS 2008 were not asked in WVS 2010-14 namely: frequency of political discussions, 
index of inclusive views on nationality, scale of opposition to social change, and the index of political 
socialization within family. Despite these limitations, the overall explanatory power of the statistical models   
employed to predict both petitioning and demonstrating in 2008 and 2011/12 is comparable and  
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times more likely to report participation in demonstrations than non-members, controlling for 
other factors in the model. On the other hand, civil society membership was a non-significant 
predictor of attending demonstrations before the economic crisis, when in both countries 
members of CSO were only more prone to sign petitions than non-members. Although 
initially protests might have been animated by unions that were voicing discontent over 
economic hardships and austerity measures, it seems that subsequently other social agents 
such as civil society organizations (CSOs) started to mobilize people for protests targeting 
broader issues (e.g. political corruption, environmental protection, urban planning, etc.). 
While the economic downturn could have imposed constraints in the funding resources of 
many of these organizations and networks, both in Slovenia and Romania the mobilization 
capacity of CSOs seems to have increased after 2008. Overall, membership in civil society 
organizations significantly grew in both countries. Data from the WVS/EVS surveys show 
that in Romania the share of respondents who reported membership in at least one CSO7 rose 
from 19% in 2008 to almost 30% in 2012, while in Slovenia it grew from 46% in 2008 to 
over 55% in 2011. Students were also increasingly more likely to participate in street 
demonstrations during the economic crisis in both countries. However, data on Romania 
reveals that among younger age cohorts, only students and those connected with various 
social networks and organizations and having certain motivations were particularly more 
prone to participate in protests. In addition, those living in large cities have also higher 
chances of both signing petitions and attending demonstrations than those living in small 
rural localities from Romania. On the other hand, in Slovenia employed persons were almost 
3 times more likely to demonstrate than the rest the adult populations, all other things being 
equal.  
 Education is the strongest predictor of reporting signing petitions in Slovenia and the 
second most important one (after interest in politics) in Romania, controlling for all the other 
variables in the model. In both countries, those expressing higher levels of support for the 
democratic system of governance during the economic crisis were also more likely to report 
petition signing than those supporting authoritarian or technocratic forms of governance. In 
2008 this factor had no statistically significant effect on petitioning in neither of the two 
countries. Overall, the predictors of joining street demonstrations and signing petitions seem 
to perform in a rather similar way before and during the economic crisis in Slovenia and 
                                                          
7 The EVS/WVS ask about membership in an extensive list of voluntary organizations ranging from 
environmental, consumer, religious, sport, art or recreational organizations to professional associations, 
humanitarian or charitable organizations and mutual aid groups. 
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Romania. However, in the context of an overall increase in protest mobilization, the effects of 
some predictors appear to have been elevated.  
        
Conclusion 
 
The main results of analyses carried out in this paper suggest three interwoven 
pathways to protest actions in post-communist SEE. First, within the instrumental path 
manifested mainly through attentiveness to, and interest in politics, protest is seen as a means 
to achieve certain goals, such as to protect or increase specific rights. Second, following the 
logic of identification, manifested in data used here mainly through ideological and value 
self-identification people protest to express their indignation when their values have been 
violated (Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Dijk 2009). Yet the two logics are not mutually 
exclusive, but rather complementary. Third, mobilizing contexts are needed to create actual 
opportunities for protest action. Membership in various civil society organizations and 
belonging to different politicized social networks provide the mobilizing context in which 
both instrumental and ideological motives can lead to protest action. 
Although in SEE people protest less than citizens living in Western Europe, protesters 
in both regions tend to have similar socio-demographical and attitudinal profiles. Contrary to 
what radical disaffection theories might suggest, protesters in post-communist SEE are on 
average democratically oriented citizens of their countries. They tend to support democracy 
as a form of government and generally ask for more open, responsive and accountable 
democratic governance. However, this finding should not be interpreted in a deterministic 
way, but rather in probabilistic terms. In other words, by no means my results imply that only 
democratically oriented citizens do protest, while authoritarian minded people do not. 
Without excluding the protest participation of some extremist segments of the population 
(sometimes highly publicized in the media), my results do suggest however that in this 
region, as well in as Western Europe, those who tend to support democracy as the only 
legitimate system of governance are more likely to protest than those who prefer authoritarian 
alternatives to democracy. And this positive relationship between what David Easton (1975) 
called “diffuse democratic support” and protest participation holds even after we control for 
the effect of various socio-demographic and attitudinal factors. In the same time, protesters in 
this region also tend to have stronger ideological identifications on the Left-Right axis 
compared to non-protesters, although the left-right semantics might have different meanings 
in Western and Eastern Europe. Moreover, they usually do not come from the lower strata of 
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the society as disaffected radicalism theories would predict, but rather from the higher 
income, better educated and post-materialist segments of the population that are more open to 
the idea of social change. In this sense, protesters from SEE do resemble to a certain degree 
to their western counterparts. 
While the public opinion data used in the paper (i.e. World Values Surveys and 
European values Surveys) are useful in analyzing general features of protesters by comparing 
those who have demonstrated or signed petitions with those who have not, this kind of data 
do not tell us much about what people were protesting against (van Stekelenburg and 
Klandermans 2013a). Despite these limitations, the findings presented in this paper do 
explore some of the factors that can account for the citizens’ preference for certain forms of 
protest actions versus others. Furthermore, since this research shows that people are more 
likely to engage in protests when they are more interested in politics, when they have certain 
values and ideological orientations and when they are socially embedded in various 
mobilizing networks, it opens new directions for studies that can test the robustness of these 
findings in different contexts, such as the recent economic crisis. This paper made a first step 
in this direction by exploring the patterns of protest politics during the economic crisis 
through a comparative analysis of Slovenia and Romania. As some research suggest, 
economic hardships and employment insecurities “generate political apathy as people’s 
efforts are devoted to participating in the market, and they have less time to become 
politically active” (Oxhorn 2009, 228). However, worsening economic conditions and 
governmental policies that imposed austerity programs during the recent economic recession 
created new mobilization opportunities for existent and newly emerged social actors that 
managed to politically activate increasing segments of the population. The cases of Slovenia 
and Romania seem to support this pattern of antigovernment mobilization since in both 
countries social movements spread during the economic crisis and protests became an 
increasingly used means to voice popular discontent against austerity, but also against 
corruption and bad governance in general.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
Table 3: Explaining petition signing in post-communist SEE (Exp(B) logistic regression coefficients) 
 
 
Albania 
2008 
Bosnia 
Herz. 
2008 
Bulgaria 
2008 
Croatia 
2008 
Montenegro 
2008 
Romania 
2008 
Romania 
2012 
Serbia 
2008 
Slovenia 
2008 
Slovenia 
2011 
Macedonia 
2008 
Kosovo 
2008 
SEEa 
2008 
WEb 
2008 
CEEc 
2008 
FSUd 
2008 
Gender (men) 1.16 0.99 1.12 0.98 0.96 1.56* 1.04 1.32 0.79 0.64** 1.75*** 1.01 1.14** 0.88*** 1.08 1.09 
Age 50+ (ref.)  - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - 
18-29 0.94 1.29 0.77 1.19 1.54* 0.70 1.39 1.22 1.53 0.84 0.64* 0.88 1.16* 0.72*** 0.87 0.55*** 
30-49 0.80 1.07 0.96 1.42* 0.96 1.33 1.19 0.98 1.46* 1.43 0.81 1.11 1.16** 0.97 1.01 0.82* 
Level of Education 1.10 1.18* 1.33** 1.08 1.04 1.31** 1.32*** 1.13 1.38*** 1.27*** 1.01 1.21** 1.17*** 1.16*** 1.04 1.06 
Household Income 1.12* 1.19* 1.24* 0.99 1.34** 1.12* 0.99 1.02 1.07 0.88** 1.14* 1.09 1.14*** 1.07*** 1.07** 0.94* 
Size of locality 1.01 1.07* 0.97 1.12*** 1.14** 0.94 1.13** 1.09** 1.03 1.01 1.17*** 1.24*** 1.07*** 0.99 1.02 1.05*** 
Student 1.00 3.26*** 1.54 1.89* 1.66 2.07 1.14 1.46 1.99* 2.85** 1.25 0.78 1.48*** 1.16* 0.79 1.01 
Employed 1.26 1.64** 1.76* 1.02 1.34 1.63* 1.22 1.24 1.45* 1.51* 1.08 1.35 1.18** 1.16*** 0.95 1.23** 
Trade unionist 0.59 1.11 1.63 1.71* 2.76** 1.31 2.30** 1.45 1.12 1.16 2.37** 0.42* 1.10 1.18*** 1.62*** 0.95 
Political Party Member 1.47 1.70 4.53*** 1.29 2.02* 1.53 0.83 2.19** 1.75 0.99 
 
1.67* 1.05 1.51*** 1.20* 1.25 1.93*** 
Civil Society Member 3.29*** 1.83** 1.44 1.25 1.08 1.60* 2.09*** 1.21 1.41* 1.35 1.37* 1.58* 1.56*** 1.54*** 1.71*** 1.37*** 
Frequency of Church 
attendance 
1.00 1.06 0.98 1.03 1.11* 0.98 0.98 1.03 0.99 1.06 0.96 0.99 1.03* 0.94*** 1.05*** 1.03 
Political Discussion  1.99** 0.84 1.00 1.38* 1.22 1.47 NA 1.49* 1.41* NA 0.93 1.04 1.20*** 1.27*** 1.03 1.37** 
Scale of Trust in other 
people 
0.96 1.01 1.02 1.02 0.99 1.12** 1.01 1.02 1.04 1.05 
 
1.00 1.02 1.02** 1.04*** 1.01 0.97* 
Index of Immigration 
tolerance 
0.99 0.99** 1.01 1.00 0.99* 0.98** 0.84 1.00 1.00 0.82 
 
0.99** 1.02** 0.99*** 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Index of Lifestyle 
tolerance 
1.05*** 1.05*** 1.02 1.04*** 1.02* 1.01 1.02 
 
1.02 1.05*** 0.60 
 
1.01 1.03* 1.02*** 1.03*** 1.04*** 1.02** 
Scale of Gender Role 
Traditionalism 
0.73** 0.82* 0.74* 0.85 0.96 0.69** 0.93 1.06 1.03 0.80 
 
0.96 1.31*** 0.92** 0.87*** 0.87*** 1.10** 
Index of Post-
materialism 
1.25 0.96 1.28 1.05 1.61** 1.97*** 1.35 0.97 0.95 1.17 
 
0.77* 1.08 1.09* 1.15*** 1.27*** 1.22** 
Cosmopolitan sense of 
belonging 
1.15 1.57 1.00 1.12 1.55 1.88 1.33 1.74** 1.09 1.31 
 
0.95 3.22*** 1.52*** 1.00 0.93 1.31* 
Index of Inclusive views 
on Nationality 
0.95 1.06** 1.14** 1.01 0.97 1.08* NA 1.10*** 1.01 NA 1.06* 1.12*** 1.06*** 1.03*** 1.01 0.99 
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Albania 
2008 
Bosnia 
Herz. 
2008 
Bulgaria 
2008 
Croatia 
2008 
Montenegro 
2008 
Romania 
2008 
Romania 
2012 
Serbia 
2008 
Slovenia 
2008 
Slovenia 
2011 
Macedonia 
2008 
Kosovo 
2008 
SEEa 
2008 
WEb 
2008 
CEEc 
2008 
FSUd 
2008 
Scale of opposition to 
social change 
1.28 1.24 0.61* 0.65** 0.65* 1.26 NA 0.89 0.96 NA 1.06 0.62** 0.86** 0.84*** 0.89 0.88 
Ideological 
self-
placement 
on the Left-
Right scale 
Center 
(ref.) 
 - -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Left 0.56** 1.71* 0.82 1.66** 1.22 1.56 1.70* 1.02 1.34 0.98 1.07 1.04 1.26** 1.41*** 1.32*** 0.97 
Right 0.66 1.79* 1.21 2.10*** 2.62*** 0.94 1.54 1.59* 1.38 0.60 1.08 1.59* 1.42** 1.08 1.34*** 1.60*** 
Index of Trust in  
Political Institutions 
0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.82*** 1.08 0.97 1.03 0.95 0.91 1.02 1.01 1.02 0.97*** 1.00 1.03* 
Index of Political 
Socialization within 
family 
1.09** 0.95 1.04 1.04 1.03 0.97 NA 1.11*** 1.02 NA 1.05* 1.05* 1.05*** 1.05*** 1.03** 1.04*** 
Scale of Political 
Interest 
2.25*** 1.44*** 1.16 1.23** 1.97*** 1.19 1.54*** 1.31** 1.29** 1.29** 
 
1.73*** 1.57*** 1.40*** 1.35*** 1.45*** 1.42*** 
Index of Democratic 
Support 
1.01 1.24*** 1.06 1.01 1.01 0.98 1.19** 1.03 1.02 1.12* 
 
0.96 1.02 1.06*** 1.02** 1.24*** 1.05** 
Nagelkerke R2 .331 .260 .204 .214 .262 .216 .246 .214 290 .223 .243 .282 .191 .257 .154 .082 
N 1534 1512 1500 1498 1516 1489 1495 1512 1366 1055 1494 1601 15022 24980 10817 10528 
Note: Data represent Exp (B) coefficients of a binomial logistic regression model with the dependent variable Signing a petition having two categories: 1=Yes and 0=No (non-
petitioners is the reference category). Exp (B) coefficients are odds ratios: values higher than 1 represent a positive effect, values below 1 represent a negative effect of a predictor 
variable on the dependent variable, controlling for the effect of all other variables included in the statistical model. The statistical significance of coefficients is presented as: *p<0.05, 
**p<0.01, ***p<0.001. For nominal or ordinal predictors, the reference category’s parameter is set to 0, because it is redundant. Example of reading data: men, compared to women, are 
1.14 times more likely to have signed a petition, all other things being equal (see column 12, line 2 in this table). 
aSEE here includes: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, FYR Macedonia and Kosovo. 
bWE here includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Malta, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
cCEE here includes: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovak Republic. 
dFSU here includes: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.  
Data source: EVS 2008. 
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Table 4: Explaining participation to lawful demonstrations in post-communist SEE (Exp(B) logistic regression coefficients) 
 
 
Albania 
2008 
Bosnia 
Herz. 
2008 
Bulgaria 
2008 
Croatia 
2008 
Montenegro 
2008 
Romania 
2008 
Romania 
2012 
Serbia 
2008 
Slovenia 
2008 
Slovenia 
2011 
Macedonia 
2008 
Kosovo 
2008 
SEEa 
2008 
WEb 
2008 
CEEc 
2008 
FSUd 
2008 
Gender(men) 1.51* 1.84* 1.66* 1.17 1.24 1.51 2.16*** 1.34 2.01*** 1.14 2.10*** 1.31* 1.58*** 1.18*** 1.18* 1.17* 
Age 50+ 
(ref) 
                            
18-29 1.36 0.71 0.41 0.85 1.06 0.56 0.22*** 0.87 0.52 0.51 0.66 1.04 1.06 0.91 0.44*** 0.56*** 
30-49 0.78 0.82 0.88 1.30 0.75 0.78 0.55* 0.93 1.29 0.71 0.68* 0.92 1.01 0.95 0.69*** 0.69*** 
Level of Education 1.05 0.99 1.39* 1.15 1.05 1.13 1.18* 1.16 0.96 1.10 1.09 1.04 1.11*** 1.10*** 1.19*** 1.16*** 
Household Income 1.20** 1.24 1.15 0.95 1.03 0.94 0.99 0.95 0.87* 0.88 1.01 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.93* 0.96 
Size of locality 1.05 1.13* 0.89* 1.11* 1.06 0.99 1.17** 1.15*** 1.06 1.11 1.14*** 1.30*** 1.12*** 1.04*** 1.14*** 1.07*** 
Student 1.15 3.17** 6.70** 0.78 1.48 1.02 3.20* 2.65* 3.17* 5.63** 0.65 0.75 1.10 1.62*** 1.06 0.95 
Employed 1.32 1.23 2.35** 0.95 1.28 1.80* 1.25 1.83** 1.01 2.94** 1.06 1.32 1.14* 1.17*** 0.98 0.99 
Trade unionist 0.52 2.02 4.02*** 4.04*** 3.88*** 1.93 1.20 1.27 1.88** 2.02* 2.59** 0.81 1.84*** 1.26*** 1.90*** 1.11 
Political Party 
Member 
1.60 3.94*** 2.40* 2.97* 0.71 2.39* 1.70 2.76*** 1.93 0.43 1.67* 0.41* 1.42*** 1.41*** 1.32 2.12*** 
Civil Society 
Member 
2.66*** 2.04* 1.27 0.94 0.69 1.52 1.70* 1.87** 1.06 2.07** 1.25 2.18*** 1.23** 1.32*** 1.50*** 1.13 
Frequency of 
Church attendance 
1.07 1.02 1.22* 1.08 1.09 1.15 1.03 0.92 0.99 1.02 0.92 1.31*** 1.10*** 0.98** 0.98 1.02 
Political Discussion  2.75** 0.54* 0.97 1.32 1.00 1.05 NA 1.17 1.62* NA 1.00 1.48* 1.24** 1.40*** 1.43** 1.15 
Scale of Trust in 
other people 
0.97 1.04 1.11* 0.99 1.04 1.08 1.03 1.01 1.10* 0.96 1.00 0.96 1.01 0.97*** 1.04* 1.02 
Index of Immigration 
tolerance 
1.02 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.01 0.91 0.98*** 0.98** 0.98*** 1.01*** 1.00 1.00 
Index of Lifestyle 
tolerance 
0.99 0.99 1.03 1.04* 0.98 0.98 1.01 1.04* 1.04* 0.99 1.02 0.99 1.00 1.02*** 1.00 1.01* 
Scale of Gender 
Role Traditionalism 
0.85 1.13 0.99 0.71 0.96 0.89 0.98 0.93 0.83 0.91 0.94 1.21** 1.02 1.02 1.00 0.98 
Index of Post-
materialism 
1.15 1.40 1.29 1.13 1.78** 1.29 1.31 0.98 1.29 1.46 0.97 0.85 1.19*** 1.13*** 1.45*** 1.32*** 
Cosmopolitan sense 
of belonging 
0.81 1.45 1.08 1.07 1.32 1.76 1.83** 1.68* 1.37 1.01 1.18 2.71*** 1.72*** 1.16** 1.09 1.44** 
Index of Inclusive 
views on Nationality 
0.97 1.15*** 1.05 1.02 0.98 1.17** NA 1.01 1.00 NA 1.03 1.05 1.05*** 1.04*** 1.02 0.96** 
Scale of opposition 
to social change 
1.65* 0.98 0.55* 0.73 0.47*** 1.36 NA 1.00 0.90 NA 0.94 0.79 0.93 0.76*** 0.93 0.79** 
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Albania 
2008 
Bosnia 
Herz. 
2008 
Bulgaria 
2008 
Croatia 
2008 
Montenegro 
2008 
Romania 
2008 
Romania 
2012 
Serbia 
2008 
Slovenia 
2008 
Slovenia 
2011 
Macedonia 
2008 
Kosovo 
2008 
SEEa 
2008 
WEb 
2008 
CEEc 
2008 
FSUd 
2008 
Ideological 
self-
placement 
on the 
Left-Right 
scale 
Center 
(ref.) 
                            
Left 0.85 1.96* 1.11 1.84* 1.78* 4.78*** 1.38 1.17 1.33 0.95 2.22*** 1.41 1.52*** 2.33*** 1.15 0.84 
Right 1.83* 1.43 1.61 1.40 2.43** 1.70 1.87** 1.76* 0.65 0.80 1.97*** 1.71** 1.54*** 0.78*** 1.48*** 1.47*** 
Index of Trust in  
Political Institutions 
0.96 1.04 0.79* 0.94 0.79*** 0.98 1.02 0.93 0.93 0.99 0.96 0.93** 1.02 0.97*** 0.89*** 0.96** 
Index of Political 
Socialization within 
family 
1.09* 1.00 1.06 1.01 1.09* 1.15** NA 1.07* 1.05 NA 1.00 1.08** 1.08*** 1.04*** 1.05*** 1.04** 
Scale of Political 
Interest 
1.97*** 1.37* 1.66** 1.46** 2.02*** 1.64*** 1.53*** 1.59*** 1.26 1.75*** 1.72*** 1.20* 1.52*** 1.41*** 1.38*** 1.49*** 
Index of Democratic 
Support 
0.96 1.13 1.15* 1.09 0.91 1.08 1.01 1.17** 0.95 1.09 1.05 1.16*** 1.09*** 1.11*** 1.03 1.08*** 
Nagelkerke R2 .293 .189 .296 .192 .238 .251 .211 .284 .166 .151 .262 .268 .172 .229 .127 .106 
N 1534 1512 1500 1498 1516 1489 1495 1512 1366 1055 1494 1601 15022 24980 10817 10528 
Note: Data represent Exp (B) coefficients of a binomial logistic regression model with the dependent variable Participation to lawful demonstrations having two categories: 1=Yes and 
0=No (non-demonstrators is the reference category). Exp (B) coefficients are odds ratios: values higher than 1 represent a positive effect, values below 1 represent a negative effect of a 
predictor variable on the dependent variable, controlling for the effect of all other variables included in the statistical model. The statistical significance of coefficients is presented as: 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. For nominal or ordinal predictors, the reference category’s parameter is set to 0, because it is redundant. Example of reading data: In South-Eastern 
Europe (SEE), men, compared to women, are 1.58 times more likely to have attended a lawful demonstration, all other things being equal (see column 12, line 2 in this table). 
aSEE here includes: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, FYR Macedonia and Kosovo. 
bWE here includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Malta, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
cCEE here includes: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovak Republic. 
dFSU here includes: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.  
Data source: EVS 2008 for all SEE countries and WVS 2010-2014 for Romania (2012) and Slovenia (2011). 
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APPENDIX II 
The measures 
 
Variable/Index Measures and methods of recoding/building variables/indices 
European Values Survey,  wave 4, 2008 World Values Survey, wave 6, 2010-2014  
Gender 1=Male, 0=female 1=Male, 0=female 
Age Recoded into 3 intervals categories 1=”18-29”, 2=”30-49”, 3=”50+” Recoded into 3 intervals categories 1=”18-29”, 2=”30-49”, 3=”50+” 
Level of education Highest level of education attained by respondent. Missing values 
replaced with mean. 
Highest level of education attained by respondent. Missing values 
replaced with mean. 
Household income Scale ranging from 1 to 12 Scale ranging from 1 to 10. 
Size of locality Scale ranging from 1 to 8, i.e.  1=’under 2,000’... 8=500,000 and more  Scale ranging from 1 to 8, i.e.  1=under 2,000… 8=500,000 and more 
Student Dummy variable (recoded from v337): 1=yes,  0=no  Dummy variable (recoded from v229): 1=yes,  0=no 
Employed Dummy variable (recoded from v337): 1=yes,  0=no Dummy variable (recoded from v229): 1=yes,  0=no 
Trade unionist Recoded variable (v13) 1=yes,  0=no  Recoded variable (v28) 1=yes, 0=no 
Political party member Recoded variable (v14) 1=yes,  0=no Recoded variable (v29) 1=yes, 0=no 
Civil Society Member  Recoded variable for membership in at least one CSO (v10-12, v15-20): 
1=yes, 0=no 
Recoded variable for membership in at least one CSO (v25-27, v30-35): 
1=yes, 0=no 
Frequency of church 
attendance 
V109 scale ranging from 1 (more than once a week) to 7 (never) V145 scale ranging from 1 (more than once a week) to 7 (never) 
Political discussion Recoded variable for engagement in political discussions with friends 
(v7): 1=yes, 0=no  
Not asked 
Scale of trust in other people Scale ranging from 1 =’Most people would try to take advantage of me’ 
to 10 =’Most people would try to be fair’ (v63). Missing values replaced 
with country mean. 
Scale ranging from 1 =’People would try to take advantage of you’ to 10 
=’People would try to be fair’ (v56). Missing values replaced with 
country mean. 
Index/Scale of Immigration 
tolerance 
Additive index based on variables v268-v272, and v274-v275. Cronbach’s 
Alpha= 0.861 
V46 ‘When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of 
this country over immigrants’, 1=agree, 2=neither, 3=disagree 
Index of lifestyle tolerance Additive index based on variables (v242-244) regarding the degree to 
which homosexuality, abortion and divorce are justifiable  
Additive index based on variables (v203-205) regarding the degree to 
which homosexuality, abortion and divorce are justifiable 
Scale of gender role 
traditionalism 
V103 ‘When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women’,  
recoded into 1= disagree, 2=neither, 3= agree 
V45 ‘When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than 
women’, recoded into 1=disagree, 2=neither, 3= agree 
Index of post-materialism 1 =Materialist, 2= Mixed, 3 = Post-materialist 1 =Materialist, 2= Mixed, 3 = Post-materialist 
Cosmopolitan sense of 
belonging 
The feeling of belonging to the world (v253), 1=yes, 0=no ‘I see myself as a world citizen’ (v212), 1=yes, 0=no 
Index of inclusive views on 
nationality 
Additive index based on scores from variables v276, v278, v279, v280  Not asked 
Scale of opposition to social 
change 
V200, 1=’The entire way our society is organized must be radically 
changed by revolutionary action’ 2=’our society must be gradually 
Not asked 
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Variable/Index Measures and methods of recoding/building variables/indices 
European Values Survey,  wave 4, 2008 World Values Survey, wave 6, 2010-2014  
changed by reforms’ 3=’our present society must be valiantly defended 
against all changes 
Ideological self-positioning on 
the Left-Right scale 
Recoded variable (v193), 1=Left, 2=Right, 3=Center Recoded variable (v95), 1=Left, 2=Right, 3=Center 
Index of trust in political 
institutions 
Additive index measuring trust in national government , parties and 
parliament  (v211, v221, v222 reverse coded) 
Additive index measuring trust in national government , parties and 
parliament  (v115, v116, v117 reverse coded) 
Index of political socialization 
within family 
Additive index based on reversed scores from variables v361, v362, 
v365,v366 
Not asked 
Scale of political interest  V186 recoded: How interested are you in politics? 1-not at all, 2- not 
very interested, 3-somewhat interested, 4-very interested 
V84 recoded: How interested are you in politics? 1-not at all, 2- not very 
interested, 3-somewhat interested, 4-very interested 
Index of democratic support Additive index based on v225, v226, v227, and v228 (scores reversed) Additive index based on v127, v128, v129, and v130 (scores reversed) 
 
 
 
 
 
